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The smooth-tongued criminal lawyer, who pleads for leniency
for his hard-visaged, brutal client, has become one of the cliches
of American criminal law enforcement. Bad as the man's record
may be, vicious though his crime, his lawyer is sure to find some-
thing about his personality, his family, or his avocation, which
may endear him to the judge who is about to sentence him. No
one likes to pay the penalty for his crimes, and the surest way of
avoiding or mitigating a "rap" is to convince the judge that
there is still plenty of sweetness and light left in the poor defend-
ant who has had the misfortune to be caught and convicted of
a crime. When a man comes up for sentence, therefore, his
closest friend would not recognize him from the description
which the lawyer furnishes the judge. The eulogy may reach
such a pitch that one may begin to wonder whether the man
before the bar is a candidate for a prison sentence or a candidate
for a Boy Scout decoration.
But there is a statute of the great and sovereign State of New
York, the Parole Commission Law, presently applicable only to
New York City, which compels a strange sort of candor from the
gentry who make crime their racket and from their legal repre-
sentatives. Under this statute, a man convicted of a misde-
meanor may be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of up to
three years imprisonment in Riker's Island Penitentiary, if he
is capable of being substantially benefited by the correctional
or reformatory purposes of this institution. If he is incapable
of benefiting from "the correctional or reformatory" purposes
of Riker's Island, his maximum sentence must be one year of
imprisonment. As Justice McGeehan puts it, "In other words,
if two men jointly commit a misdemeanor in New York City,
and one is so bad that the Court finds that he is incapable of
substantial benefit from the correctional purposes provided by
the Parole Commission Law, the maximum of his term of incar-
ceration is one year, whereas his co-defendant, because the Court
finds he is not incapable of substantial benefit as provided in the
Parole Commission Law, may be incarcerated for three years."
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Thus, the more promising a defendant, the more likely he is to
get an indeterminate sentence of up to three years. The more
vicious, depraved and hardened he is, the more likely he is to
receive a lesser sentence carrying a one year maximum.
This turns the scale of values existing elsewhere in the crim-
inal law completely topsy-turvy. This law is tougher on more
decent offenders and easier on more wicked ones. Under such
statutory provisions, it is to the advantage of a misdemeanant
to have himself painted a black-hearted scoundrel who cannot
possibly be reformed or rehabilitated.
However, the candor which would compel a lawyer to present
his client in the worst possible light may not be displayed before
the sentencing judge. For the latter has considerable discretion
with respect to sentence. If a lawyer were to paint his client in
his true light, the judge may impose the most severe sentence at
his disposal, namely, the indeterminate sentence on the theory
that no one is so vicious or depraved that he cannot benefit from
the correctional purposes of the penitentiary. But this sentence
is precisely what the lawyer would like to avoid. Accordingly,
when the hardened burglar, thief or dope peddler, who has had
the misfortune to be convicted of a misdemeanor stands before
his judge for sentence, his lawyer will still try to characterize
him as an erring Boy Scout in order to persuade the judge not
to impose the indeterminate sentence.
However, if the judge is not impressed andc imposes the three
year indeterminate sentencei then candor will have its innings.
For there is always an appeal and, there is always recourse to-a
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the indeterminate sen-
tence imposed by the judge violated the express directions of
the Parole Commission Law and was therefore illegal. Now the
lawyer can pull out all -the stops and blow up every peccadillo
in which his client has been involved as evidence that he is one
of the worst scoundrels on the face of the earth and therefore
cannot possibly be reformed or rehabilitated by any institution.
Consider for example the case of People v. Bendix (1932, 260
N.Y. 590>. Bendix was a hotel thief who had rifled many rooms
of the Hotel Warwick. He pleaded guilty to unlawful entry and
the Court imposed the indeterminate sentence. In his attack on
this sentence in the Court of Appeals, the defendant's attorney
stated, "The criminal record of the defendant is such as to call
for the irresistible legal conclusion that he is so anti-social as
to be considered an habitual criminal who is mentally unamen-
able to ref ornmatory treatment." Calling upon the Bible for as-
sistane - (JTeremiah 13:23), the attorney foi' the defendant stated,
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"He can no more be substantially reformed than an Ethiopian
can change his skin or a leopard his spots."
It was the District Attorney in this case who urged that the
defendant was not so far gone in infamy that he was incapable
of being substantially benefited by the correctional and reforma-
tory purposes of the penitentiary. The District Attorney par-
ticularly noted the fact that for five years prior to the instant
conviction he had "presumably led a good life," since there
were no entries on his criminal record during this time. How-
ever, the defendant's attorney argued that, "In view of the past
record of the defendant he may have committed crimes during
this period," since, "The police do not catch all offenders."
Unfortunately, the judges of the superior courts who handle
appeals and writs of habeas corpus have been only too ready to
support the erring interpretation of their less highly-placed col-
leagues. Over and over again they have denied relief to black-
hearted villains on the convenient fiction that as long as the
judge imposed an indeterminate sentence, he must have believed
that the defendant was capable of reformation or rehabilitation.
For example, a drug peddler, named Granza, came up before the
Court of Special Sessions and the Court in sentencing him to the
penitentiary stated, "I don't see how we can extend any leniency
in these cases because, of all the despicable people on earth oper-
ating criminally, those who sell drugs are among the worst."
The defendant brought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the Court could not legally impose the indeterminate sen-
tence because it believed the defendant incapable of reformation
or rehabilitation. But the defendant's contention was rejected
on the ground that, "Under the authorities, the possibility of
benefit by such sentence is to be conclusively presumed from the
very sentence of the court however incongruous." (People ex
rel. Granza v. Johkston, 1946, 67 N.Y.S. (2nd) 181.)
The reductio ad absurdum of this type of reasoning is appa-
rent in the case of People ex rel. Wallace v. Ashworth (1945, 59
N.Y.S. (2nd) 344: On January 15, 1941, the defendant came
before Judge Freschi of the Court of General Sessions who de-
termined that he was beyond reform and sentenced him to one
year definite sentence on each of four misdemeanors, the sen-
tences to run consecutively. This finding of Judge Freschi was
based on the fact that the offender had been in and out of prison
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York almost continuously
since 1912 on felony and misdemeanor convictions. He came out
of the penitentiary on the above mentioned sentences and was
again arrested and indicted for burglary, petty larceny and pos-
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session of burglar's tools. He pleaded guilty to unlawful entry
and Judge Goldstein of the Kings County Court sentenced him
to an indeterminate term in the penitentiary. The prisoner sued
out a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that this sentence was
illegal. The Court stated that it appears logical to regard a
defendant who was determined to be beyond reform on January
14, 1941, as also beyond reform on August 29, 1944, a few months
after his release on his latest sentence. Nevertheless, the court
dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and sent the offender back
to Riker's Island Penitentiary.
Occasionally, however, a judge of the appellate court will read
the statute he is asked to apply and will decide that a sentencing
judge cannot have it both ways. He cannot make a statement like
the following: "You are practically beyond redemption. You
don't mind committing crime and you don't mind going to jail,
so you must love it," and then proceed to impose a sentence
whose prerequisite is a finding that the defendant is capable of
reformation and rehabilitation. The indeterminate sentence in
such a case will be declared illegal and the defendant will be sent
back for re-sentence for one year instead of three. (People ex
rel. Travatello v. Ashworth, 1943, 43 N.Y.S. (2nd) 397.)
Since hope springs eternal in the human breast, each defend-
ant receiving an indeterminate sentence to Riker's Island Peni-
tentiary likes to believe that his own brand of villainy has been
sufficiently deep-dyed so that the Parole Commission Law cannot
be applied to him. Thus, writs of habeas corpus continue to be
applied for, appeals continue to be taken, and the sorry farce
of depiciting the offender in the worst possible light so that he
will receive a more lenient one year sentence instead of an inde-
terminate three year sentence, continues to be played. It often
happens that the lawyer for the defendant is compelled to sing
one kind of a tune before the sentencing judge and an entirely
different one before the court in which he has applied for a writ
of habeas corpus or to which he has taken an appeal. For exam-
ple, in the case of People v. La Rue (1943, 266 A.D. 995), the
attorney for a female drug peddler tried to convince the Court
that his client was only a user of drugs whose twelve prior con-
victions for prostitution were only "social offenses, quasi-
criminal in nature." He pointed out that she "has not done
anything that is vicious or bad and should be given a chance to
rehabilitate herself." Before the appellate court however, he
urged strongly that because of the twelve prior convictions for
prostitution, and the conviction for drug peddling, that the
defendant was not a fit person for rehabilitation.
109o]
MORRIS PLOSCOWE
It is to Katherine B. Davis, John Purroy Mitchell's Commis-
sioner of Correction from 1914 to 1915, that we owe this piece
of legal fantasy. She was impressed with the fact that since 1905
New York City had been operating a reformatory for young mis-
demeanants based on an indeterminate sentence of up to three
years. She wanted to have this indeterminate sentence law
extended to misdemeanants who were sentenced to the New York
City Penitentiary. She thought of the Penitentiary as a reform-
ative and rehabilitative institution and wanted to keep the more
promising offenders for longer periods, so as to make certain
of their reformation and rehabilitation. She was not concerned
with the more unregenerate among the criminal fraternity con-
victed of misdemeanors, and believed that they should be kept
for the maximum possible under the existing statutes, namely,
one year. The fact that this would result in a shocking disparity
of sentence, with the tougher criminals serving less time than
the more promising ones, did not concern Miss Davis. For she
was convinced that a penitentiary regime based on reformation
and rehabilitation was quite a different thing from a peniten-
tiary regime based on punishment. It was, therefore, justifiable
to submit a more promising offender to the former, since it was
in his own interest, even though he served a longer time than his
more hardened confederate.
There might have been some justification for Miss Davis'
views if Riker's Island or its predecessor, the Blackwell's Island
Penitentiary, were ever reformative or rehabilitative institu-
tions. Both have been merely custodial institutions hardly dis-
tinguishable from any of the prisons of the State. Riker's Island
Penitentiary has always lacked the basic tools of a reformative
and rehabilitative institution. It has never had an adequate edu-
cational, vocational or classification program, nor the therapeu-
tic methods which are indispensable to a reformative institution.
As for the Blackwell's Island Penitentiary, its predecessor, the
stench of its scandals hardly provided the atmosphere for re-
form. Worse yet, there is not even a pretence of providing a
different type of penal discipline for the indeterminate sentence
prisoners, who are supposed to be in the Penitentiary for the
purpose of reform and rehabilitation and the workhouse pris-
oners who are on Riker's Island for the purposes of punishment.
All prisoners sentenced to the workhouse for ten days or more,
all prisoners sentenced to the Penitentiary on definite sentences
of up to one year, and all indeterminate sentence prisoners axe
commingled in the same institution, and are subjected to exactly
the same type of prison discipline. The so-called promising mis-
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demeanant who has received a rehabilitative indeterminate sen-
tence rubs shoulders with the chronic drunk or bum who has
received a short workhouse sentence, or the more hardened thug
who has a definite sentence for a misdemeanor or a felony. Life
for all these offenders follows exactly the same pattern. To talk
of reformation or rehabilitation in one case, and punishment or
custody in the other, is merely to designate the same phenomenon
by different words.
If the Riker's Island Penitentiary does not in fact provide a
rehabilitative regime for indeterminate sentence prisoners, then
there is no legal justification for the Parole Commission Law.
What this statute does in effect is to make possible a severer
punishment for misdemeanants in New York City than in the rest
of the State. A person who steals a suit in a department store
in White Plains can be sentenced only up to one year imprison-
ment. If he stole the same suit in a department store in New
York City, lie could be sentenced up to three years. Our learned
appellate courts have sustained the discriminatory treatment of
New York City's malefactors on the ground that they were to be
subjected to a rehabilitative regime, while those in benighted
Westchester County would receive only punishment for their
crimes. They would not have sustained such discrimination if
ftle Parole Commission Law had merely provided stiffer punish-
ments for crimes committed in New York City. Criminal statutes
are supposed to have a universal application throughout a state.
They cannot go easy in one part of a state and provide for
heavier punishments for the same crimes in a different part of
the state. The equal protection of the laws is still a vital prin-
ciple of constitutional law.
It is obvious that the New York appellate courts have been
beguiled by theoretical differences between rehabilitation and
punishment, which under the present corrective system are not
realized in practicc. They have felt that there is some qualita-
tive distinction between these two phenomena which justifies the
discrininations of New York City's Parole Commission Law.
However, if we avoid semantics and look at the facts, then there
is no legal basis for the Parole Commission Law, for it provides
for a geographic discrimination in sentences for crime on the
basis of non-existent qualitative differences in treatment after
sentence.
The time has come when the numbo-jumbo of the Parole Com-
nission Law must be eliminated. This may require an increase
in the maximum punishments for certain types of misdemeanors
which are committed by habital offenders, for a one year term
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is hardly enough to protect the community from a hardened
burglar who is fortunate enough to be permitted to plead guilty
to unlawful entry, a misdemeanor. But if the one year maximum
punishment for -certain misdemeanors or for certain types of
offenders is to be increased, this must be done by laws of state-
wide application, and not by laws applicable to New York City
alone. Such laws should be framed frankly on the conception of
protecting the community from the possibility of further depre-
dations by habitual or professional criminals, and not on any
phony theory of the distinction between rehabilitation and pun-
ishment. If the penitentiary develops a rehabilitative regime,
well and good. But a criminal statute should not be based on
this dream, but on the fundamental notion of providing the state
with the best possible protection against crime.
